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ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT UNDER SEVENTEENTH
SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
----------- 0 -- -
The Act 29 Car. IIc.3 entitled "An act for the pre-
vention of fraud and perjuries 0 and better known as the
Statute of Fraudsremainsafter an experience of over
two hundred yearsthe most remarkable embodiment of
purely legal reformwhich the history of our common law
affords. It came into operation on June 24th.1677,and
has probably given rise to more litigation than any
enactzaent ever placed upon a statute book. Who is
the author of this marvelous piece of legislation is not
definitely known, but Sir Lionel JenkinsLord Keeper
Guilford,Lord Nottingham and Sir Matthew Hale seem to
share equally the praise from the legal profession,and
the blame from the defeated litigants,for the prepara-
tion and guiding of this Bill through the House. Who
the originator of the Statute wasis of very slight im-
portance,the fact remainsthat it has modified the ju-
dicial procedure of the courts throughout Great Britain
and the United States,and regulated modern methods and
dealingsin the most momentous affairs of coummon life.
Notwithstanding the re-enactment of this Statute by so
many independent legislatures its original form has
suffered very little change.
The following discussion will be devoted entirely
to show what acts are essential to constitutean accep-
tance and actual receipt of part of the goods sold)with-
in the meaning of that portion of the Statute known as
section 17,which reads in the original enactment and
which has been substantially re-enacted wherever the
Statute appearsas follows :- 'And be it further enact-
ed: Triat no contract for the sale of any goods,wares,
and merchandises for the price of ten pounds sterling
or upwardssall be allowed to be goodexcept the buyer
shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually re-
ceive the same or give something in earnest to bind the
bargain or in part paymentor that some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract or their
agent thereunto lawfully authorized."
The words of this section tiat the sale "shall not
be allowed to be good,except the buyer shall accept part
of the goods so sold,and actually receive the samed seem
clear am' simplebut from the large number of cases
litigated and judicial opinions rendered upon their in-
terpretation,it can be seen that no little difficulty
-has been experienced in determining what acts are neces-
sary to constitute a sufficient acceptance and receipt
to satisfy their requirements.
The earlier cases confound the meaning of these
two words with delivery,and many late ones carelessly
use the word delivery as though it were equivalent to
them. In Searle vs.Keeves 2 Esp.598 (1799) Eyre C.J.
says:- "The Statute of Frauds,does not attach where there
has been earnestor a deliver, of a part of the things
sold."
In Chaplin vs.Rogers 1 East 192 (1800) Lord Kenyon says:
5'I do not mean to disturb the settled construction of
the statute,thatin order to take a contract for the
sale of goods of this value out of it,there must be
either a part delivery of the thing or a part payment
&c., And again in a note to Anderson vs.Scot 1 Camp.
235 (1808) Lord Ellenborough spoke of 'an incipient de-
livery sufficient to take the case out of the Statute
of Frauds.'
Similar expressions occur in cases as late as 11 Johns.
283. 8 L.J.Q.B.(N. S.)258 and 97 Ind.253. On the
other hand the plain wording of the statute is disre-
garded by some and it is treated as though it read ac-
ceptance or actual receipt and the Superior Courts have
been frequently called upon to reverse or overrule de-
cisions of this nature.
The basis of the wnole law upon the subject is,
that in order to manifest an acceptance and receipt
within the meaning of the statute,the buyer must deal
with the goods~in such a way,as to prove that he re-
cognizes the existence and obligation of a contractand
the property must pass entirely beyond the doainion and
control of the seller Thus as the following quota-
tions fro,-a some of the leadinZ cases will showthere
i,ust be a delivery by the vendor and an acceptance by
the vendee,the one without the otner will not satisfy
the requirements of the statute. In Stone vs.Brownirg
et al. 51 N.Y. 211 an action to recover the price of
goods sold under a verbal contractLott Ch.C. said 'The
mere receipt is not a compliance with the requirements.
There must be some act or conduct on the part of the
buyer dilicating and manifesting his intention in receiv-
ing themto accept them absolutely and unconditionally
in execution and full performance of the contract of
sale. N
Earl C.in the same case said 'There was no compliance
with the statute unless the defendant both accepted and
received the cloth purchased,or some of it. It was not
sufficient to answer the statute that the cloth was de-
livered to the defenylants,they must also have accepted
it. A delivery of property to satisfy the require-
ments of the statute of frauds,must be a delivery by the
vendor with the intention of vesting the right of pos-
session in the vendee,and there must be an actual accep-
tance by the latter with the intent of taking possession
as owner. U
And again in Caulkins et al.vs.Hellman 47 N.Y.453
Rapallo J. says 'There must be not only a delivery of
the goods by the vendor,but a receipt and acceptance of
them by the vendee,to pass the title or make the vendee
liable for the priceand his acceptance must be volun-
tary and unconditional- Even the receipt of the goods
without an acceptance is not sufficient. " This rule
is established by the authorities beyond a question and
is laid down in 2 B.& C. 511,48 Me.381,120 Mass.290,36
N.H.311 and numerous other cases including Billen vs.
Henkel 9 Colo.394.
9Having seen that both acceptance and receipt are
essential to satisfy the requirements of the statute,it
will next be necessary to show what acts are requisite
to constitute such an acceptance,and what to establish
a sufficient receipt.
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The rule as laid down by Lord Blackburn was "So
long as the buyer can without self contradiction, declare,
that the goods are not to be taken in fulfilment of the
contracthe has not accepted them. Ar it is ima-
terial whether his refusal to take the goods be reason-
able or not. The question is not wfiether he ought to
accept,but whether he has accepted them. The question
of acceptance is a question as to what was the intention
of the buyer as signified by his outward acts.m
In the case of Morton vs.Tibbett (see ante) Lord Campbell
lays down the following rule:- 'We are of opinion that
there may be an acceptance and receipt within the mean-
11
ing of the act,without the buyer having examined the
goods or done anything to preclude him from contending
that they do not correspond with the contract. The
acceptance to let in parol evidence of the contract,ap-
pears to me,to be a different acceptance from that which
affords conclusive evidence of the contract having been
fulfilled.' These two rules cannot stand together
since the basis of Blackburn's rule is that until the
buyer has done something to preclude hitm from objecting
to the goods there is no acceptance,while Campbell's
rule says there may be an acceptance sufficient to
satisfy the statute and the buyer not precluded from ob-
j ecting. The part of Blackburn's rule which says 'If
there has been no acceptance the statute is not satis-
fiedwhether vendee ought to have accepted or not' is
good lawbut the first part is bad and Morton vs.Tibbett
holds although some of its dicta have been overruled. Sir
Robert Campbell in looking at these rulings laid down the
following propositions.'Acceptance may be conditional anl
if a case should arise on a verbal contract,where the
buyer accepts the goods conditionally,and afterwards
rightly refuses to take themthe statute has not been
complied with.' But this makes the question of
whether there is a contract or not depend upon whether
or not the contract has been carried out. With refer-
ence to this subject Mr.Leake in his work on contracts
p.281 says:l"Upon an acceptance and receipt within the
statute being established,the contract is left to the
rules of comnon law:the evidence is no loger restricted
and it may be proved in the form in which it was in fact
made. The receipt of the goods refers to the pos-
session and necessarily imports a delivery of the pos-
session aatual or constructive to the buyer. The
statute mentions acceptance as well as receipt,and it
is generally stated that both these requisites must
exist or else the statute is not satisfied; thus imply-
ing that the acceptance may be something different from
and not included in the receipt of them. According
to the course of judicial decisions that prevailed for
some time,it was held that the acceptance was to be un-
derstood with reference to the contract,and required
such an act as precluded the buyer from disputing the
14
performance of the contract as to the goods accepted:
but it has since been deliberately decided,that such an
acceptance is not intended,and that the buyer may ac-
cept and receive the goods in a manner to exclude him
self from the statute,and to render himself chargeable
upon a parol contract,yet wittiout precluding himself
from any remedy for not delivering according to the
contract if charged in an action for the price. The
modern decisions however) since abandoning the test cf
acceptance by reference to the contractare not equally
conclusivenor indeed give much satisfaction as to the
manner or quality of acceptance intended that may be
short of accepting the goods as satisfying the contract
and at the same time distinct from or adided to the re-
It seems therefore more con-ceipt of possession.
venient to treat the acceptance and receipt as a com-
bined or compound requirement of the statuteuntil some
necessity may occur for separating them.'
This is the way a great many writers treat this
subjectand it cannot be denied that there is a great
deal of difficulty in distinguishing in soi..e of the
cases whether the acts proved constitute receipt or
acceptance or boththe judges have spoken very impa-
tiently of the confusion~anyi that the decisions are con-
fused is seen in the fact that Mr.Benjamin misquotes
many of the judgments in order to make them come into
line at alland from the fact that Campbell puts several
cases under the head of acceptancewhich are put by
Benjamin under the head of actual receipt.
A few notes frome some of the leading and much
cited English decisionswill show how the law stands
on this point in Englandwhere it is comparatively
settled.
Morton vs.Tibbetts 15 G.B.428(1850)
On Aug.25th.defendant made a verbal agreement with
plaintiff for the purchase of 50 quarters of wheat ac-
cording to sample. Defendant by agreement sent a
general carrier next morning to a place named,and the
wheat was placed on board carrier's lighter for
conveyance via canal to Wesbeach,where it arrived Aug.
28th. In the meantime on Aug.26th.the defendant resold
the wheat by the same sampleand on condition that it was
to be as represented to him,the defendant by the plain-
The wheat upon arriving was examained and weighed
by the purchaser and rejected on account of its being
short weight. Defendant wrote plaintiff on 30th.re-
jecting wheat as not up to weight.
in tne possession of the carrier.
The wheat remained
This action being
brought to recover the price the defendant pleaded,
statute of frauds. Court gave judgment for plaintiff,
Lord Campbell saying:- 'The acceptance is to be something
which is to precede,or at any rate to be contemporaneous
with the actual receipt of tne goods; and is not to be a
subsequent act after the goods have been actually receiv-
ed, weighed) measured, or exa.iined. As tne Act expressly
makes the acceptance and actual receipt of ari part of
the goods sold sufficient,it must be open to the buyer
to objectat all eventsto the quantity and quality of
tiff.-
the residue; and even where the sale is by sample,tIat
the residue offered does not correspond with the sample!
..... 'We are of opinion tiiat tiiere may be an
acceptance and receipt within the meaning of tne act,
without the buyer having examined the goods,or done any-
thing to preclude him from contending that they do not
correspond with the contract. The acceptance to let
in parol evidence of the contract,appears to us to be a
different acceptance from ttiat which affords conclusive
evidence of the contract having been fulfilled. - - .
We are therefore of opinion that although the defendant
had done nothing whiCn would have precluded him from oo-
jectingthat the wheat delivered to the carrier was not
according to the contract,tnere was evidence to justify
the jury in finding that the defendant accepted and re -
ceived it."
It is to be noted that the doctrine in the above
caseviz: that the acceptance must precede or be con-
temporaneous with the receipt of the goodsis in all
the late cases where the olc rule has been departed from
subsequent or contemporaneous with the receipt.
The case of Morton vs.Tibbett was followed in
Kibble vs.Gough 38 L.J.N.S. 204 (1878),where defendant
verbally agreedl to purchase a specific quantity of barley
from the plaintiff on the terms that the bulk should be
as well dressed as the sample. The plaintiff accord-
ingly delivered an instalment of the barley to defen-
dantwhose foreman received it and gave a receipt marked
"not equal to sample! Next morninU defendant himself
inspected the bulk and wrote immediately to plaintiff
refusing to accept,on the ground that the barley was
'not well dressed nor equal to sample.' The plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant for goods sold
and delivered and at the trial Pollock B. left the fol-
lowing questions to the jury- Was there a contract ?
Was there acceptance by the defendant of part of the
barley ? And was the barley equal to sample and pro-
perly dressed ? All of which questions the jury an-
swered in the affirmative. A rule nisi for a new trial
was grantedand on argument to make the rule absolute
the opinion in Morton vs.Tibbett was sustained.
Bramwell L.J. said:- 'I will not say that the decision in
Morton vs.Tibbett was wrong: on tne contrary I tnink it
A man may accept goods without losing his
right of objection to them a Brett L.J. said uThere
must be an acceptan-ce and an actual receipt;no absolute
acceptance but an acceptance which could not have been
made except on admission of the contract and the goods
sent under it. I am of opinion that there was a suf-
ficient acceptance under the statute of fraudsalthough
there is a power of rejection. I think the
decision in Morton vs.Tibbett is right,and that such an
acceptance is sufficient although the purchaser in cer-
tain oases may still have nis right of rejection.
Cotton L.J. 'I quite agree with the principle laid down
in Morton vs.Tibbett.-... All that is wanted
is a receipt and such an acceptance of the goods as
was right.
shows that it has regard to the contract,but the con-
tract may yet be left open to objection.' Closely
following this decision comes Rickard vs.Moore 38 L.T.N.S
841. Plaintiff verbally sold to defendant six bales of
wool on July 31st. Plaintiff delivered goods at Railway
station and they were there received by defeidant,who un-
packed the wool and wrote same day to plaintiff,that two
bales were inferior to sample. Plaintiff replied by
letter Aug. lst.denying that the bales were not equal to
sample. On Aug.4th.defendant -Aho had been from home
since Aug.lst. returnedand having seen plaintiff's
letter,sent the goods back to the railway station,and
wired plaintiff his refusal to accept them. Betwecn
July 31st.and Aug.4th.defendant offered the goods for
sale on the market)stating however)that he had not ac-
cepted them and that he would make other arrangements
before he could sell. Plaintiff having brought this
action to recover the price of the goods,the jury found
the goods not up to sample and a verdict was given for
defendant.
It seems difficult to distinguish this case from
tliat of Kibule vs.Gough decided by the same court a
few months previous in which the same judges wrote
opinions,but the way in which Bowen L.J.in the next
case,treats them shows the distinguishing point.
Page vs.Morgan L.R.15 Q.B.D.228 (1885)
Defendant bought of plaintiff by oral contract 84
quarters of wheat. The sale was by sample. The wheat
was shipped by barge and arrived at defendants mill at
nightand at eight next morning some of the sacks by
direction of the defendant's foreman were hoisted up
out of the barge,to the mill,and examined by him.
After 24 sacks were hoisted up,defendant arrived and in-
spected the sacks Lnd ordered more to be sent up.
When 38 had been sent up defendant told bargeman to send
up no moreas the wheathe said,was not equal to sample.
Defendant same day notified plaintiff that wheat was not
up to sample and that he should not take it. Some days
after the wheat in defendant's mill was restored to the
barge,which remained at defer&ant's mill until suit was
brought,when the wheat was sold by order of oourt,and the
money paid into the same to abide the event of the action.
The jury were directed on authority of Morton vs.Tiboett
and Kibble vs.Gough that there was evidence of an ac-
ceptance by defendant sufficient to constitute a con-
tract within the l7th.sec. of the statute of frauds,
although defendant was not precluded from rejecting the
wheat if not equal to sample. The jury found the
wheat was equal to sample , and that defendant had ac-
cepted it within the meaning of the l7th.sec.and gave a
verdict for plaintiff. On a motion for a new trial on
the ground that there was no evidence for the jury of an
acceptance of the wheat oy defendant to satisfy the
statute: Brett M.R.said;- 'It seems to me that Kibble vs.
Gough lays down the governing principle with regard to
the questionwhether there is evidence of an acceptance
to satisfy the 17th.sec. It was there pointed out
that there must be under the statute both an acceptance
and actual receipt,but such acceptance need not be an
absolute acceptanceall that is necessary is an accep-
tance which could not have been made except upon an ad-
mission that there was a contract and that the goods
were sent to fulfil that contract. Cotton L.J.in giv-
ing judguent in tnat case said "All that is wanted is a
receipt and such an acceptance of the goods as shows
that it has regard to the contract,but the contract may
yet be left open to objection) so that it would not pre-
clude a man from exercising such a power of rejection.
I think that in this case enough has been done to sat-
isfy the statute." In the present case how could de-
fendant have these sacks taken in the mill and there
opened and examinedwithout the recognition of the exis-
tence of a contract,entitling him so to deal with them ?
How could a reasonable man come to any other conclusion
from his dealing with them, than that he had made a con-
tract of purchase with regard to them,and that the goods
were delivered to,and received by him under such con-
tract and examined by him to see if they were according
to the contract ? It seems to me clear that under
these circumstances there was evidence for the jury of an
acceptance within the mea-ning of the statute. I can con-
ceive of many cases in which what was done with regard to
the delivery and receipt of the goods,may not afford evi-
dence of an acceptance. Suppose that goods being
taken into defendants warehouse by defendants servants,
directly he sees them instead of examining them he or-
ders them to be turned out or refuses to have anytiiing to
There would then be an actual delivery,
but there vould be no acceptance of the goodsfor it
would be quite consistent with what was done that he en-
tirely repudiated any contract for the purchase of the
same. I rely for the purpose of my judgment in the
present case on the fact that defendant examined the
goods to see if they agreed with the sample. I do not
see how it is possible to come to arV other conclusion
with regard to that fact than that it was a dealing with
the goods involving an admission that there was a con-
tract.0
Bowen L.d. 'Having regard to the mischief at which the
statute was aimed,it would appear a natural conclusion
that the acceptance contemplated by the statute was such
a dealing with the goods as amounts to a recognition of a
do with thema.
contract. That is the effect of the decision in
Kibble vs.Gough. In Rickard vs.Moore there was a dis-
tinction. In Kibble vs.Gough the goods were found to be
equal to sample,and it therefore became necessary to
decide in that case whether there was an acceptance with-
in the l7th.sec. In Rickard vs.Moore the goods were
found not to be equal to sample,so it was only necessary
to decide whether they were rightly rejected . I do not
think that Lord Bramwell by his remarks on what had thus
become a by pointcan have intended to overrule the
previous decision of this court. In any case we are
bound by the decision in Kibble vs.Gough. " Baggally L.J.
in above case clearly means to say that there may be a
conditional acceptance depending on trie fulfilment of
the contract as laid down in Campbell's rule,which is
clearly untenable. Bowen L.J. in explaining this gets
rid of Kibble vs.Gough perhaps,by saying that they dis-
posed of the question of fulfilment of the contract first
and afterwards of acceptancethe contract having been
fulfilled,but it is difficult to see how you can con-
sider a contract fulfilled before you establish the con-
tractayl in explaining Rickard vs.Moore he fails en-
tirely since he makes the question as to whether there
was a contract depeid wholly on the fulfilment.
The Law Guar.Rev- for April 1893 mentions the fact
that another important case has been decided upon this
pointTaylor vs.Smita it is said to tnrow some doubt
upon the souiIness of the judgment in Page vs.Morgan,or
at any rate~prove that the judgment has not all the ef-
feet generally attributed to it.
tain a full report of it,the case of Page vs.Morgan will
have to remain for the purposes of this paper as the
English authority of today which is shortly stated as
follows: that it is not necessary in order to satisfy
the requirements of the l7th.sec.of the statute,tnat
there should be an absolute acceptance of goodsthere is
sufficient evidence of an acceptance of goods within the
statutewhere upon delivery of the goods the purchaser
has received them,and done aiy act in relation taereto,
recognizing the existence of a contract for the purchase
of them,though he subsequently refuses the goods.
Stevens in 1 Law Quar.Rev.14 gives the following very
complete and comprehensive classification of the law
upon the subject of acceptance.
Not being able to ob-
'Acceptance may either precedeor accompany~or follow
the actual receipt of the goodsand may be inferred as
a faat from any of the circumstances mentioned in the
following classes.
I. Where goods are marked or set apart for the buyer
with his consent before his actual receipt of them,or
where he inspects ar. approves them Oefore his actual
receipt of them.
II. Where the buyer oiits to reject goods actually
received by him for an unreasonable time after he has
had an opportunity of exercising the option (if he has
an option) of rejecting them.
III. Where tne buyer acts with reference to the goods
or to documents of title representing them,before or af-
ter their actual receipt in a manner in which the owner
only would be entitled to act in relation to them.
If the buyer directs the seller to send the goods to the
buyer by any common carrier or other person, such common
carrier or other person is not deemed to be the agent
of the buyer for the purpose of accepting the goods.
A tender of the goods for acceptance,and a wrongful re-
fusal to accept is not deemed to be equivalent to an
acceptance of them. *
The law on this subject in the United States is
far from being settled but seems to require,that the
buyer shall take the goods as owner under a contract of
sale. In Remick vs. Sandford 120 Mass.309 Devens J. says
the acceptance must'be by some unequivocal act done on
the part of the buyer,with the intent to take possession
In Knight vs.Mann 120 Mass.219
where goods were selected by the vendee's order,placed
ready for delivery and seen by buyer who promised to call
for them,they having been destroyed by fire,it was held
that there had been no sufficient acceptance. Thi s
case is followed by Atherton vs.Newhall 123 Mass 141 and
in New York by Stone vs.srowning 51 N.Y.211 s.c.68 N.Y.
598 where it was held that there must be an acceptance
of the goods with tne intention of taking possession as
owner absolutely and unconditionally, in full performance
of the contract of sale.
On the other hand are the cases of Meyer vs.
Thompson (Oreg.) 18 Pac.Rep.16 where the acts of the
servants of the buyer in removing coal from a wharf to
of the goods as owner.' "
his premises was a sufficient acceptancejalthough he had
never seen the coal and when he did see it refused to
accept it. And Vanderoilt vs.Little 43 N.J.Eq. 669
where it was held that an actual taking of goods deliveit
ed under certain contractsand use of the goodsamounted
to an acceptance although they were taken in ignorance of
certain factsand not accepted on account of those con-
tracts.
SOF THE GOODS.'
The law is apparently well settled both here and
in England that acceptance of a sample,where it is un-
derstood by both parties that the sample is to form part
of the goods sold,and to diminish the quantity or weight
thereof to the extent of its bulk is sufficient to satis.
fy the requirements of tie statute.
Moore vs.Love 57 Miss.765.
Fanner vs.Gray 1O Neb. 401
Hinde vs.Whitehouse 7 East 558.
So also where only part of the goods are in exis-
tence at t.ie time of the contract ar acceptance of that
part is sufficient.
Scott vs.Eastern Counties R.Co.12 M & W 33
Van Woert vs.Albany & Sus.R.Co.67 N.Y. 538.
8 P AR T
And where several purchases are made at an auc-
tion,for example,where the price of each is less than
the amount named in the statute,but the aggregate is
greater, the acceptance and receipt of one article, if the
whole thing fons one transactiOnis sufficient to satis-
fy the statute.
Allard et al.vs.Greasert et al.61 N.Y.l.
Garfield vs. Paris 96 U.S.557 where liquor and la-
bels were purchased and the labels received - held a
good acceptance to take the case out of the statute.
38
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Stephens 1 Law Ouar.Rev.16 says mA buyer is said




seller or his agent actually delivers the
buyer or his agent or authorizes the buyer
to assume control of the goods,wherever they
may be.
II. When the seller continues to hold the goods after
the sale agreeing with the buyer to hold them as a bail-
ment from the buyer.
III. When,the goods being at the time of the sale in the
poss'ession of any person as agent or bailee for the
seller, it is agreed between the buyer and tne seller and
such agent or bailee,that such agent or bailee shall frau
the time of the agreement hold the goods for the buyer
and not for the seller.
IV. If at the time of the sale the buyer himself holds
the goods as agent or bailee for the selleran agree-
ment that the buyer shall from the time of such agree-
menthold the goods as owner may be inferred as a fact
from any dealings by the buyer with the goods incon-
sistent with the continuance of his of his relation of
agent or bailee to the seller.*
Pollock's definition of receipt is;'the mere
physical transfer of the goods without any animus
possedendi.
Probably as good a definition of receiptlas can be
given isthat the seller must divest himself of his
lien,and since possession is necessary by the purchaser,
he must have either actual or constructive possession.
There must be a taking by the purchaser or his authoriz-
ed agent,with the intention of holding adversely to the
seller,merely placing them in the buyers custody is not
enough.
Baker vs.Cuyler 12 Barb.667.
Where the parties entered into a verbal agreement
for the sale of wheat the defendant to take all left in
plaintiff's barn, after a certain order was filled.
Previous to said order being filled the defeiYIant went to
plaintiff's barn and took 100 bushels. Plaintiff ob-
jected to his taking it and demanded its returndefen-
dant refus d. After the above order had been filled
there still remaird 340 bushels defendant having re-
fused to take his plaintiff sold it arxl brought the
present action to recover the difference between the
price received and that agreed upon~and sought to hold
him to the contract on the ground that defendant had
accepted and actually received part of the goodsbut
the court held such a receipt not good. In order to
constitute receipt there must be an actual or construe-
tive deliveryjand this was merely a trespass on the part
of defendant; a mere getting into custody without the
consent of plaintiffthe plaintiff had not lost his lien,
as he could have brought an action in tort against the
defendant and recovered the grin actually converted or
the price of it~irrespective of the alleged contract.
Nor does placing the goods in a third persons hands for
delivery upon certain conditions being co:lplied with,
constitute receipt,although there is in a sense a pos-
session by the buyer,it is not adverse to tnat of the
seller who still retains his lien.
The court in Hinchman vs.Lincoln 124 U.S.49 quotirg
44 N.Y.643 and 1 N.Y.261 lays down the following rule
'there must be acts of such a charac t er as to unequi-
vocally place the property *ithin the power,and under the
exclusive dominion of the buyer as absolute owner dis-
charge.' of all lien for the price."
The duration- of this possession is i,=aterial for,
the act once done can not be undone.
Somers vs.McLaughlin 58 Wis. 358.
For the purpose of considering the authorities
actual receipt may be divided in the following classes:-
I. Where there is a delivery of part or the whole of
the goods to the buyer himselfand a taking by him per-
sonally with the intention of maintaining a possession
adverse to the seller.
II. Where there is a delivery to an agent appointed by
the buyer,and a taking by such agent with the buyers
ass entwit a similar intent.
III. Where the goods remain in the haiyds of the vendor
or a former agent of his)in the changed character of
bailee of the buyer.
The first of these divisions is so clear as not to
need any authoritythe veidors lien is gonethe party
is in possession of the goods with the intention of
holding adversely to the vendoreverything necessary
to constiture receipt is present. Under the second
division is necessarily involved the question of delivery
to a coron carrier; upon this subject Benjamine says:-
"It is well settle. that the delivery of goods to a cor.-
mon carriera fortieri, to one specially designated by
the purchaser, for conveyanice to him or to a place
designated by him,constitutes an actual receipt by the
purchaser. In such cases the carrier is in contempla-
tion of law,the bailee of the person to whom,not by whom,
the goods are sent,the latter in employing the carrier
being considered as an agent of the former for that
purpose.' Parsons says he thinks this proposition open
to much doubt. Campbell although recognizing Benjamin's
statement denies it and asserts the opposite. He says
there is no receipt while the goods are in transitu i.e.
while the vendor has the r-ght to stop the goods in
transitu,and that Benjamines reasoning is that vendor
is vendee's agent to employ carrierand thus the carrier
having been employed by an agent of vendee,is employed
by the vendee hiLiself as his agent to receivethe goods.
But says Caimipbell,this is presuming a good ,ontrkct be-
tween the vendor and vendee whicu is the very thing you
want to prove~since the vendor is not vendee's agent
unless the contract is established. Is Berjamine fal-
lacious ? No his reasoning properly stated is. That there
is an actual receipt of tne goods by the vendeebeuause
there is a good authorization from vendee for vendor to
employ carrier for him,and tLiis autnorization has nothirg
to do with the contract to be established,and need not
be in writing.
Langdell agrees with Benjamine but on different
groundsand does not follow Campbell. He makes carrier
vendee' s agent. He says that whose agent the carrier
is,and therefore whether there has been delivery de-
pends upon whd pays the carrier.
I. If vendee is to pay for carriage,there is actual
receipt by vendee when the goods are delivered to the
carri er.
II. If vendor is to deliver at any particular place,
tnere is no actual receipt until they are delivered there.
III. That even where the goods are forwarded at buyer's
expease, there is no receipt when the jus lisponendi
is reserved.
IV. It seems the same effect will be had if carrier
agrees with seller not to deliver the goods to the
buyer, except on payment of the price.
Stephens says:- If the buyer directs the seller to send
the goods,to the buyerby any common carrier or other
person,such carrier or other person is deemed to be the
agent of the buyer for the receipt of the goods.
All writers agree with Lord Blackburn's rule that
receipt by a common carrier is not acceptance because
he has no authority to accept ,to form the intention of
takin5 , and the riles as to receipt by couion carrier
seem by the authorities to be properly stated by
Benjadaine and Langdell. Cross vs.O'Donnell 44 N.Y.
6u3 may be cited as an illustrative authority on this
point. In this case the plaintiff entered into a verbal
agreemea with defendant for the sale of some barrel
hoops,the defendant agreeing to buy if he could have
them landed in New York at $14.00 per thousand. The
master of ship OCurlewO offered to take them for defen-
dant at $2.50 a thousandand plaintiff agreed to deliver
on board steamer for $11.50. They were accordingly
shippedconsigned to defendantwho was to pay the
freight. The vessel being lost on the voyage the de-
fendant refused to pay for them,on the ground that there
had been no actual receipt of them by him. The court
held that suc'i a delivery to a carrier designated by
defendant was an actual receipt by him of the goods,
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.
Under the third division Benjamine has two state-
ments which seem to be conflicting,in sec.1d7 ne lays
down the proposition that in order to constitute receipt,
the vendor must part with his liento quote his words,
he says uIt is safe to assume as a general rule that
whenever no fact has been proven showing an abandonment
by the vendor of his lien,no actual receipt by the pur-
cnaser has taken place' and at sec.801 he says 'In cases
wnere the vendor retains possession of the chattel,in
the chanjed character of bailee for the buyer,there is a
clear distinction between such a delivery as would suf-
fice under the Statute of Frauds,and a delivery suf-
ficient to divest the vendor's lien." In support of
the latter statement he cites Townley vs.Crump 4 A.& E.
58 and Dodsley vs.Varley 12 A.& E.632. The first case
seems to decide really not wnat was exactly a verdor's
lienas that there was a right of stoppage in transitu.
Vendee was bankruptand the whole stress was laid on that
fact. The right of vendor was a purely equitable one
analogous to the right of stoppage in transitu. Tne
Judges make it depend on the insolvency of vendee by
reason of which the vendor acquired the right to retain
the goods in his possessionfor the unpaid purchase money
and this is no more icconsistent with sale,than the
right of stoppage in transitu. Therefore the case is
not a very strong one on which to support such a con-
tention. In Dodsley vs.Varley the question was
whether tae vendor had lost his lien,for if notit was
conceded that there was no actual receipt to take the
The facts were that a parcelcase out of the statute.
of wool was bought by defendant while it was in the
plaintiff's possession; the price was agreed on but
the wool would have to be weighed,it was sent to the
warehouse of a person employed by the defendant and
weighed and packed but not paid for. Defendant in-
sisted that tne vendors lien remained and that the goods
had been actually received by hi,.. as purchaser. The
court held that tne property had passed,that tne goods
had been delivered and were at tae risk of the pur2aaser.
In reiation to the vendors rigiIt tney said "The plaintiff
had not what is called a lien, determinable in the loss of
possession but a special interest,sometil.,es but improper-
ly called a lien,growing out of his original ownership,
and consistent with the property being in the defendant.
This he retained in respect of the term agreed upon, that
the goods should not be received to their ultimate place
of destination before nayment.' This case should
cause Benjamine no difficulty in sec.801 since he says
in sec.188 *It is plain tnat tiere is nothing in this
case which conflicts wit. the rule - tinat there can be in
actual receipt by purchaser while vendor's lien continues
for the court held that the lien." The authorities
do not seem to support sec.801 but the law as stated in
sec.187 is goed both in this country and in England
and it appears from an exa .:ination of the decisions that
the vendor must not only be holding as bpileebut his
lien must be parted with in order to bring the case
within tne statute.
Green vs.Merriam 28 Vt.804.
Elmore vs.Stone 1 Taunt.458.
Some text writers make another division under this
head that is where the goods are in the hands of the
buyer or his agent at the time of tie salethe real
question under such conditions isthat there must be
some outward act capable of being reasonably interpreted
as showing an intention on tne part of the bailee to
hold the goods henceforthi as owner. Tlas appears to be
rather a question of acceptance tnan receiptjand would
be more properly treated under that head. As Campbell
says "The goods being in actual possession of vendee the
question is merely one of acceptance' and adds 'the ques-
tion is has the party taken the goods as owner.
Having shown tnat acceptance ani receipt are both
necessary and v.hat acts are essential to constitute them
it now remains to consider the question of time . When
must these acts take place ? The authorities on this
point are clear tiat they may occur at any time before
the action on the contract is institutedbut will not be
sufficient if they take place after the action is brought
or after the contract has been revoked by the seller.
The rile in New York formerly was as laid down in
2 Sandf.239,that the acceptance and receipt must be at tne
time the contract was entered into but this case is over-
ruled by Jackson vs.Tupper 101 N.Y.518 where the court
said that the acceptance and receipt might be at any time
after the oral contract was made. In Sullivan vs.
55
Sullivan (Mich.) 38 N.W. 472 the court held thtat an accep-
tance prior to the recision of the contract was good but
it must be before such recission.

